

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07

IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 ACDE-00

ERDE-00 /089 W

-----181633Z 064348 /41

P R 181541Z MAY 77

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2140

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0239

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES
OF MAY 17, 1977

BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE MAY 17, 1977 INFORMAL SESSION OF THE
VIENNA TALKS, THE FIRST AFTER THE SPRING RECESS, THE ALLIES
WERE REPRESENTED BY THE CANADIAN REP, UK REP AND THE US REP;
AND THE EAST BY SOVIET REPS TARASOV AND SHUSTOV, CZECHOSLOVAK
REP MEISNER, AND GDR REP OESER. MILITARY ADVISERS ALSO PARTICIPATED.

2. THE SESSION WAS RELATIVELY BRIEF. EASTERN REPS PRESSED THE
MERITS OF THEIR FREEZE PROPOSAL, DESCRIBED AREAS OF COMMON
UNDERSTANDING (THAT THERE WOULD BE TWO PHASES OF REDUCTION
WITH THE US AND SOVIETS REDUCING FIRST), AND CHARACTERIZED
AS OBSTACLES TO FURTHER PROGRESS A NUMBER OF ASPECTS OF THE
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WESTERN POSITION INCLUDING THE COLLECTIVE CEILINGS, REFUSAL
TO AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS AND REFUSAL OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA TO UNDERTAKE COMMITMENTS
FOR PHASE II REDUCTIONS. EASTERN REPS SAID WESTERN REFUSAL
TO TABLE NATIONAL TOTALS WAS ALSO AN OBSTACLE TO ANALYZING
THE DATA TABLED BY BOTH SIDES.

3. WESTERN REPS SAID THE DATA DISCUSSION WOULD HAVE TO CONTINUE SINCE PARTICIPANTS HAD TO HAVE AGREEMENT ON DATA FOR THE PURPOSES OF CALCULATING REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS. THE EAST HAD MADE NO MOVE COMPARABLE TO THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF DECEMBER 1975 AND HAD THUS FAR FAILED TO GIVE A SERIOUS RESPONSE TO THESE PROPOSALS. WESTERN REPS PRESENTED REASONS FOR THE WESTERN POSITION CALLING FOR COLLECTIVE CEILINGS ON WESTERN AND EASTERN MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA WITH SUBCEILINGS ON THE US AND THE USSR AND THEY PUT FOUR FURTHER QUESTIONS ON EASTERN DATA.

4. TARASOV SAID THAT AS RESULT OF EASTERN INITIATIVES, CERTAIN POSSIBILITIES EXISTED OF RAPPROACHEMENT BETWEEN APPROACHES OF THE TWO SIDES. A COMMON UNDERSTANDING EXISTED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS IN TWO STAGES, WITH THE FIRST STAGE OF REDUCTIONS BEING OF US AND SOVIET FORCES ONLY, AND THERE HAD BEEN RECOGNITION BY THE WEST OF THE NEED TO COVER NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS. BUT THE AREA OF COMMON UNDERSTANDING WAS SMALL AND THE WEST'S CONTINUED EFFORTS TO SECURE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE WAS BLOCKING FURTHER PROGRESS. THIS ATTITUDE HAD BEEN EVIDENCED BY WESTERN REJECTION OF THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL. TARASOV DESCRIBED THE MERITS OF THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL, WHICH HE CLAIMED HAD RECEIVED NEW IMPETUS THROUGH THE TABLING OF DATA BY BOTH SIDES.

5. UK REP SAID WESTERN FIGURES WHICH THE WEST CONSIDERED ACCURATE, SHOWED A LARGE DISPARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER. TO ACCEPT AS A BASIS FOR AGREED REDUCTIONS THE EAST'S CONTENTION THAT THERE WAS APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE MILITARY MANPOWER OF
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THE TWO SIDES WOULD AMOUNT TO ACCEPTANCE OF AN OUTCOME OF FICTITIOUS PARITY WHILE IN FACT SANCTIONING A DISPARITY. IN DECEMBER 1975, THE WEST MADE AN IMPORTANT ADDITION TO ITS REDUCTION APPROACH. THE EAST HAD MADE NO SUCH MOVE AND HAD THUS FAR FAILED TO GIVE A SERIOUS RESPONSE TO THE WESTERN PROPOSALS.

6. GDR REP DESCRIBED SOME ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION WHICH HE CLAIMED WERE BLOCKING PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND SHOWED THAT THE WEST WAS SEEKING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE. WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA WERE REFUSING TO UNDERTAKE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS. THE WESTERN POSITION MADE CLEAR THAT THE WEST DESIRED TO REDUCE SOVIET FORCES UNILATERALLY. THE WEST REFUSED TO AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS. THE DECEMBER 1975 WESTERN PROPOSAL CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL OF OBSOLETE AMERICAN WARHEADS WAS DESIGNED TO DISGUISE THE WESTERN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF SOVIET FORCES. THE WEST WAS PRESSING FOR ASSYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS BASED ON AN INVENTED DATA ASSESSMENT. THE WEST DEMANDED COLLECTIVE CEILINGS WHILE SEEKING TO IMPOSE A NATIONAL CEILING ON THE

SOVIETS. THE WEST WAS DEMANDING WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY
AND ALL ITS ARMAMENTS IN RETURN FOR SELECTIVE THIN-OUT OF
US FORCES.

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PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 ACDE-00
ERDE-00 /089 W

-----181636Z 064475 /41

P R 181541Z MAY 77
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2141
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0239

FROM US REP MBFR

7. CANADIAN REP PRESENTED REASONS FOR WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A
COLLECTIVE CEILING ON EASTERN AND WESTERN MILITARY MANPOWER IN
THE AREA WITH SUBCEILINGS ON THE US AND SOVIET MANPOWER.
THE WEST'S NEED FOR COLLECTIVITY WAS BASED ON THE FACT THAT IN
ORDER TO OPERATE NATO'S INTEGRATED MULTI-NATIONAL DEFENSE
SYSTEM, THE PARTICIPATING ALLIES REQUIRED FLEXIBILITY TO
APPORTION THE DEFENSE BURDEN AMONG THEMSELVES AND ON THE FACT
THAT SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER ON THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET
UNION, WHICH WAS ADJACENT TO THE REDUCTION AREA, WOULD NOT BE
LIMITED WHILE ALL NATO MANPOWER IN THE AREA WOULD BE. CANADIAN
REP SAID SUBCEILINGS ON SOVIET AND US MILITARY MANPOWER WERE
JUSTIFIED BY THE UNIQUE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THESE TWO PARTI-
CIPANTS AND THE FACT THAT SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER ON SOVIET
TERRITORY WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS; THE
WEST COULD NOT ACCEPT AN OUTCOME WHEREBY THE LEVEL OF SOVIET
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MILITARY MANPOWER COULD INCREASE NOT ONLY IN THE ADJACENT SOVIET UNION BUT ALSO IN THE REDUCTION AREA ITSELF.

8. CZECHOSLOVAK REP DEVELOPED THEME OF ALLEGED WESTERN EFFORTS TO GAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE AT THE COST OF THE EAST. THE SAID DATA TABLED BY BOTH SIDES SHOWED APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE AREA. EASTERN DATA WAS ACCURATE BUT THE WEST HAD NOT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ITS OWN FIGURES ON WARSAW PACT FORCES WERE WRONG. THE WEST WAS CREATING AN ARTIFICIAL OBSTACLE TO ANALYSIS OF DATA BY REFUSING TO TABLE NATIONAL FIGURES. THE EAST WAS PREPARED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF DATA BUT THE WEST SHOULD RECONSIDER THE FALLACIOUS BASIS OF ITS ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT FORCES.

9. THE US REP ASKED QUESTIONS ON FOUR ASPECTS OF EASTERN DATA. UK REP REFUTED CZECHOSLOVAK REP'S CLAIM THAT WEST WAS BLOCKING DATA DISCUSSION. HE SAID THE WEST CONTINUED TO BE STRONGLY INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE DATA DISCUSSION IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN FIGURES ON WARSAW PACT FORCES. THE WEST HAD PROPOSED TO TABLE SOVIET AND US DATA, THE EAST TO PROPOSE TO TABLE NATIONAL TOTALS. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE TWO PROPOSALS, WESTERN AUTHORITIES WERE CONSIDERING HOW BEST TO SHAPE THE DATA DISCUSSION IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY.

END SUMMARY.RESOR

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Message Attributes

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Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
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Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977MBFRV00239
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770177-0049
Format: TEL
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
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Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770544/aaaablzb.tel
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Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2472105
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
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TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/1dd5e390-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009